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COMMENTS 
Unreduced Royalty Arrangements and Packaged 
Patents: An Improper Extension of the 
Patent Monopoly? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The patent laws confer upon a patentee the right "to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling" his invention for a period of 
seventeen years.1 However, legal problems may arise if a patentee 
seeks to extend the scope of his legitimate seventeen-year monopoly 
by a licensing arrangement.2 Patentees may do this either by "pack-
age licensing"-that is, granting more than one patent under the 
same license-or by providing for the collection of royalties after 
the expiration of a patent. These licensing practices raise different 
problems. Package licensing arrangements have historically been 
held to be improper extensions of the patent grant only when the 
packaging can be proven to be "coercive" or "mandatory"-that is, 
when the patentee has conditioned the licensing of a desired patent 
on acceptance of one or more undesirable patents.3 On the other 
hand, the Supreme Court has recently ruled in Brulotte v. Thys Co.4' 
that the collection of royalties after the last patent incorporated into 
a licensed machine has expired subverts the policy of the patent 
system-which seeks to limit monopoly profits resulting from a 
patented invention to those earned during the seventeen-year 
period-and thus constitutes an illegal extension of the patent 
monopoly. 
Package licensing arrangements typically provide for a constant 
royalty rate which is not adjusted when patents expire prior to the 
expiration of the last patent. Therefore, after Brulotte, most package 
licenses are susceptible to attack on the theory that they improperly 
extend the patent monopoly by providing for unre~uced royalty 
rates despite the fact that some of the patents included in the package 
have come into the public domain. In Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-
Standard Concrete Wall, Inc.,5 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit adopted this theory, holding that Brulotte requires a ruling 
that a patentee is guilty of patent misuse6 if he licenses patents in a 
package without providing for reductions in the royalty rate as 
1. 35 u.s.c. § 154 (1964). 
2. The Supreme Court indicated that it would not tolerate this trend of abuse 
of the patent grant in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). 
3. E.g., American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 
649 (1961). 
4. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
5. 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966). 
6. See notes 34-40 infra and accompanying text. 
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patents expire. For this reason the patentee in Rocform was not 
permitted to protect his patent against infringement by a non-
licensee. 
This Comment will examine the merits of Brulotte and the pro-
priety of extending its rule to the package licensing context. In 
order to do this it is necessary to consider the Brulotte and Rocform 
decisions in somewhat greater detail. 
II. THE BRULOTTE AND RocFORM DECISIONS 
In Brulotte, the patentee owned seven patents which were in-
corporated into a hops-picking device. The patentee sold this machine 
to hop farmers for a flat sum, and the farmers were required to sign 
license agreements which provided that they pay the higher of a 
minimum royalty per season or an amount based upon the use of 
the machine. The license agreements further provided that payments 
were to be made after the expiration date of the last patent. A 
licensee refused to pay royalties after the last patent had expired, 
and the patentee brought suit to collect them. The Supreme Court, 
with Justice Harlan dissenting, stated that the patentee could not 
make use of any arrangement which extended the patent monopoly 
past its seventeen-year legal limit;7 thus, the patentee's efforts to 
collect royalties for the post-expiration period were held to be 
"unlawful per se."8 The Court found it significant that there was no 
provision for diminution of royalties or termination of the license 
after the last patent had expired, and it rejected the suggestion that 
the patentee offered this licensing arrangement because it was a 
convenient and reasonable way of making the patents available to 
a greater number of potential licensees by spreading the costs of 
licensing over a longer period of time. 
In Rocform, the patentee plaintiff marketed a license for a process 
to build concrete walls. The license agreement provided that the 
licensee could use a number of patents belonging to the patentee, 
and that the patentee would supply service, know-how, and certain 
materials to the licensee. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
found that the royalties were primarily for the use of the patents 
and were not consideration for the service aspects of the arrange-
ment. 9 Citing Brulotte, the court held, with one dissent, that since 
there was no termination clause, and since royalties were not dimin-
ished after the "most important"10 patent in the package had expired, 
the plaintiff had misused his patent and should be denied relief 
against infringement by a nonlicensee. 
7. The Court cited Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945), as 
authority. 379 U.S. at 31-32. 
8. 379 U.S. at 31. 
9. 367 F.2d at 679-80. 
10. 367 F.2d at 681. 
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The court apparently felt that its holding was required by 
Brulotte,11 and that a contrary result would have rendered the 
Brulotte ruling ineffective. The court evidently feared that a 
patentee could satisfy Brulotte's "last patent" test simply by tacking 
an unimportant patent onto the "most important" patent in a pack-
age, thereby postponing the expiration date of the "last patent" in the 
package and in effect allowing royalties to be collected on the "most 
important" patent after its expiration. The court's action does appear 
to promote effective implementation of the Brulotte rule. However, 
it is submitted that Brulotte was a questionable decision and there-
fore does not merit extension or protection. Moreover, it is suggested 
that the Rocform ruling raises serious doubts about the future 
viability of package licensing, which has traditionally been regarded 
as a proper way to market a group of patents. 
III. ECONOMIC .ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF BR.ULOITE 
It is necessary to resolve as a preliminary matter exactly what 
kinds of licensing arrangements are proscribed by Brulotte. For the 
purpose of analysis, royalty arrangements can be categorized as fixed 
or variable, and as deferred or nondeferred. Fixed royalty payments 
are paid at a predetermined rate which is unaffected by subsequent 
use;12 variable royalty payments are paid at a rate which depends 
upon the licensee's use of the patent, with use generally measured 
by productivity or sales. A license providing for deferred payments 
usually calls for payment of royalties both during and after the life 
of the patent; a license providing for nondeferred payments requires 
payment within the lifetime of the patent. The Brulotte decision 
appears to proscribe not only deferred variable arrangements, but 
also fixed royalty arrangements providing for deferred payments.13 
The Court stated that any attempt to reserve or continue the patent 
monopoly after the patent expires runs counter to the purpose of the 
patent laws.14 The Court made no attempt to distinguish between 
11. 367 F.2d at 681. The Sixth Circuit thought that the argument that Brulotte 
should be limited to a "last patent" test was "too broad a contention." 
12. As it appears in the text the noun "use" is generic. "Use" of a patent may 
occur, for example, when a licensee produces the patented item as an end product, or, 
as in Rocform, when he employs the patented item in the process of producing some 
other product. It has been held that a patentee may charge royalties for the use of 
his patent based upon some percentage of a licensee's total sales-including sales 
of items produced without any "use," in the strict sense of the word, of the patentee's 
patent-if the licensee has the right to use the patent and is engaged in selling items 
related to the patented item. Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827, 834 
(1950). 
13. Cf. Recent Case, Charging Royalties for Use A.ft er Expiration of Patent Un-
lawful Per Se, 79 HARV. L. REv. 199 (1965) which suggests that all royalties may now 
have to be collected in the seventeen-year period regardless of the period to which 
they apply. 
14. 379 U.S. at 31. The Court cited Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 
249 (1945). 
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the alternative royalty payment schemes offered by the patentee-
a deferred fixed minimum royalty rate and a variable rate based on 
use. Apparently both were found illegal. 
Despite the fact that the Court lumped all deferred payments 
together, fixed and variable deferrals are governed by different con-
siderations, and a rule which prohibits deferred fixed payments is 
particularly susceptible to criticism. As was pointed out by the dissent 
in Brulotte, the deferred fixed royalty arrangement should be deemed 
lawful, at least if the license makes it clear that deferred payments 
are merely "long-term installment payments of a flat sum purchase 
price."15 To understand why this is so, consider an agreement pro-
viding that the licensee will pay one hundred dollars per year for 
seventeen years-either as installments of the purchase price for a 
patented item or for the use of a patent. Disregarding the interest 
factor inherent in deferred payments, this agreement might have 
been drafted to provide that the same total sum be paid over a 
thirty-four-year period at fifty dollars per installment. The latter 
arrangement is no different in effect from a loan. Still disregarding 
the interest factor, a patentee cannot extract a greater profit from 
such an extended agreement than from an agreement providing for 
payment in full before the expiration of the patent, for if he tried to 
do so the licensee would simply go elsewhere for credit and pay the 
patentee in full before the patent expired. Thus, if the loan char-
acter of the arrangement is made clear in the contract, deferred pay-
ments of fixed royalties can hardly be objectionable under patent 
law. But, since any fixed royalty arrangement which is designed to 
spread payment over more than seventeen years could be drafted as 
a credit arrangement, it seems senseless to outlaw an arrangement 
providing for deferred fixed payments simply because the loan 
element is not made explicit in the contract. All deferred fixed 
royalty arrangements should thus be treated as a legitimate use of 
the patent monopoly. 
Variable deferrals, however, involve more than a clearly legiti-
mate use of the patent grant coupled with an ordinary credit 
arrangement.16 They permit the patentee to reap profits based on the 
patent's performance after the expiration of the statutory period.17 
The Court in Brulotte prohibited deferred variable payments with-
out a careful analysis of the economic implications of doing so. How-
15. 379 U.S. at 36. 
16. Cf. Recent Decision, Patents-Patentee's Use of a Royalty Agreement Which 
Projects Beyond the Expiration Date of the Patent Is Unlawful Per Se, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 
325 (1965). 
17. Most commentators feel that the decision would be easily circumvented by 
drafting long-term payment provisions in such a way that they could reasonably be 
construed as deferred installments. See, e.g., Recent Decision, Patents-Licensing Agree-
ments-Agreement Requiring Payment of Post-Expiration Royalties Invalid, 38 TEMPLE 
L.Q. 457 (1965). 
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ever, if such payments are to be disallowed, it should be shown that 
they are economically unjustifiable, and it is not at all clear that this 
is the case. 
The antitrust laws assume that the public benefits from competi-
tion, and competition will be promoted by laws which encourage 
people to seek licenses from a patentee. Since the financial require-
ments of potential licensees vary, more people will be able to seek 
licenses if there is a variety of permissible licensing arrangements.18 
Brulotte limits the kinds of licensing arrangements which a patentee 
may offer and thus eliminates as competitors all potential licensees 
who could operate only under a deferred variable royalty plan.19 
In this way Brulotte may have an anticompetitive effect. 
It may be argued that if a patent should prove to be highly suc-
cessful, deferred variable payments permit the patentee to realize 
greater income than he could have obtained from royalties based 
solely on the seventeen-year performance of the patent. While it is 
true that the patentee may earn more, arguably this extra profit does 
not represent an abuse of the patent grant but may be treated simply 
as compensation to the patentee for assuming the risk that the patent 
will prove unsuccessful. 
Thus, if deferred variable royalty arrangements are to be con-
demned as economically unsound, it must be shown that they have 
an adverse effect on consumer prices. Two situations must be ex-
amined: (I) the situation in which there are enough licensees to 
afford effective interlicensee competition; (2) the situation in which 
there is no such competition. Assuming that licensee firms use 
marginal-cost pricing, the following discussion will indicate that 
there can be no over-all economic detriment to consumers if variable 
deferred royalties are permitted. Moreover, it will show that in 
some circumstances the use of deferred royalty arrangements may 
be economically advantageous.20 
Turning first to the situation, in which competition exists among 
licensees, it will be assumed that, excluding the expense of royalty 
payments, both "deferred licensees" and "nondeferred licensees" 
have the same costs. During the seventeen-year patent period, non-
deferred licensees will charge higher prices than deferred licensees 
because they must pay higher royalty rates during this initial period 
than the deferred licensees, whose royalty payments are spread over 
a longer period of time. 
18. See Comment, Validity of Patent License Provisions Requiring Payment of 
Post Expiration Royalties, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 1256, 1268 (1965). 
19. Since deferred variable royalty arrangements allow licensees to enter the 
market without having to bear the burden of royalty payments as a fixed cost, if 
such arrangements are permitted they should serve to increase the number of 
licensees and hence the amount of competition in the market. 
20. The chart on the facing page provides examples of the various situations which 
are discussed in the text. 
PATENT PERIOD POST-EXPIRATION PERIOD 
Royalty Deferred Royalty 
Situation 1-.4. Cost Payments Price Cost Payments 
Outsider - - - 100 -
Nondeferred 100 + 1 IOI 100 -
Deferred 100 + .5 100.5 100 -
Assuming no cost reduction in the post-expiration period due to efficiency gained from experience during the patent period 
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Assuming that costs decrease from experience in working with the patent, and that there is competition among licensees of 
















Assuming that costs decrease, that there is no competition among licensees, and that the licensees' profit maximization point 
















Assuming that costs decrease, that there is no competition among licensees, and that the licensees' profit maximization point 
dictates a price less than 100, the cost point at which outsiders can enter the market in the post-expiration period. 














b. The figure 94+ is arbitrary and represents the fact that, due to the deferred royalty, the deferred licensee will have a profit maximization 
point somewhat higher than that of the nondefcrred licensee (but not necessarily by the amount of the deferred royalty). 
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After the patent period has terminated, the economic conse-
quences of deferred licensing arrangements will depend upon 
whether the deferred licensees have been able to achieve significant 
cost reductions as a result of their experience in working with the 
patent. If they have not achieved such cost reductions, their total 
costs, because they must continue to make royalty payments, will be 
greater than those of new firms who can at that time enter the market 
without obtaining licenses.21 However, the deferred licensees will be 
driven out of the market unless they meet the price set by the new 
entrants. Thus, the availability of deferred variable licensing arrange-
ments would benefit the consumer in this situation: during the life 
of the patent such arrangements offer consumers lower prices than 
those which nondeferred licensees would charge, and in the post-
expiration period they have no effect on normal competitive price 
levels. Admittedly, this situation is an unlikely one. Licensees do not 
accept deferred royalty arrangements unless they are reasonably 
certain of achieving significant cost advantages over potential outside 
competitors. 
When licensees do reduce production costs through experience 
in working with the patent, it remains true that, for the patent 
period, deferred licensees' prices will be lower than those charged 
by nondeferred licensees. However, in the post-expiration period, still 
assuming that there is competition among the licensees, deferred 
licensing will result in higher prices. Outsiders have greater costs 
than deferred licensees and therefore cannot force prices down to the 
levels which would obtain if the deferred licensees had no royalty 
expenses. Admittedly, deferred licensees would probably charge 
something less than outsiders, but they would presumably charge 
more than would competing nondeferred licensees, who at this point 
in time would be free of royalty obligations.22 
In the declining cost situation where there is also interlicensee 
compet_ition, it would of course be desirable from the consumers' 
point of view to have both deferred and nondeferred licensing ar-
rangements coexisting. In such a situation, consumers would benefit 
during the patent period from the lower prices which deferred 
licenses make possible, and they would benefit after the patent period 
from the lower prices which nondeferred licenses allow. However, 
such ideal conditions are improbable. Under any given patent all 
licenses will probably be of the same type-either all deferred or all 
nondeferred. Few licensees would take a deferred license if they 
knew that they would be driven out of business by nondeferred 
licensees after seventeen years; few licensees would take nondeferred 
licenses if they knew that deferred licensees could undersell them for 
21. See chart, situation I-A, note 20 supra. 
22. See chart, situation I-B, note 20 supra. 
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the first seventeen years. Thus, whenever deferred licenses are used 
and cost reductions are achieved, consumers will probably pay higher 
prices in the post-expiration period. However, the total impact of 
deferred royalty arrangements upon consumers should not be ad-
verse, for it must be remembered that consumers will pay lower 
prices during the patent period if deferred licenses are used, and this 
should offset the higher prices after seventeen years. 
Turning now to the situation in which there is no effective inter-
licensee competition, if costs do not decrease due to experience with 
the patent, then, just as in the case of interlicensee competition, the 
use of deferred royalty arrangements can result only in a benefit to 
consumers.23 However, if licensees can reduce production costs, de-
ferred licensees will still charge lower prices during the patent 
period than would nondeferred licensees because they have lower 
royalty costs. In the post-expiration period, on the other hand, the 
prices charged to consumers will depend upon the licensees' profit 
maximization point. If the price at which licensees would maximize 
profits in the absence of outsiders is above that at which outsiders 
may enter the market, both deferred and nondeferred licensees in an 
effort to limit competition will price just below the price at which 
outsiders could enter.24 In this situation, consumers benefit from the 
availability of deferred licenses. Such licenses make lower prices 
possible during the seventeen-year life of the patent and yet do not 
result in higher prices in the post-expiration period during which 
deferred and nondeferred licensees would charge the same price-
one just below the point at which outsiders could enter the market. 
If the licensees' profit maximization point is below that at which 
outsiders could effectively enter the market, deferred licensees will 
charge higher prices in the post-expiration period than would non-
deferred licensees, since they still have royalty expenses in this period. 
Thus, the economic benefit which consumers enjoy during the 
patent period because of deferred royalty arrangements will be 
nullified by higher prices in the post-expiration period.25 
It is apparent that there is no over-all economic detriment to 
consumers in any of these situations if deferred variable royalty 
arrangements are used. The worst that can be said of deferred 
royalties is that there is no economic benefit in some situations if 
such royalties are permitted. Moreover, in some circumstances it is 
possible that consumers will benefit if deferred variable royalty ar-
rangements are used. For this reason Brulotte, which appears to 
prohibit deferred variable royalty payments, is an economically un-
justifiable decision. 
23. See chart, situation I-A, note 20 supra. 
24. See chart, situation II-A, note 20 supra. 
25. See chart, situation II-B, note 20 supra. 
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IV. IMPACT OF EXTENDING BRULOTTE TO PACKAGE 
LICENSING CONTEXT 
Application of the Brulotte rule in the package licensing situa-
tion magnifies the problems raised in the single-patent context. The 
Rocform decision would require a patentee to collect the bulk of his 
royalties before the most important patent in the package expires. 
Instead of being able to spread the cost of the package evenly over 
the lives 0£ all the patents, the licensee must meet the cost of a 
particular patent within the lifetime of that patent. When the most 
important, and therefore probably the most expensive, patent in a 
package expires before the other patents, the licensee may not be 
able to meet payments on that patent before its expiration, and thus 
the effect of Rocform may be to prevent him from licensing at all. 
Rocform, then, goes a step beyond Brulotte, which simply outlawed 
royalty payments after the expiration of the "last patent." The 
effect of the Roe/ orm decision is to extend a bad rule which instead 
should have been strictly limited. 
This result was not required by the body of package licensing 
law that had developed prior to Brulotte. As noted earlier, the 
primary basis for attacking package licenses has historically been on 
the ground that they are coercive.26 It was early recognized that even 
patented items should compete in the market on their independent 
merits,27 and that a patent grant does not entitle patentees to con-
dition the license of desirable patents on the licensee's acceptance of 
unwanted patents. Thus, only "voluntary" package licenses, ac-
cepted by a licensee in the free exercise of his discretion,28 have been 
26. Coercion may be proved by showing that the patentee refused to offer less than 
the package, or by showing that although fewer patents were offered, the royalties were 
not reduced proportionately to account for this lesser offering. See, e.g., American 
Securit v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959). 
In Rocform, the court was faced with the coercion problem since that issue was 
briefed and argued by both parties. In fact, the plaintiff was so convinced that this 
was the principal issue in the case that it did not even cite Brulotte in its brief. The 
court, however, avoided the coercion question and relied on the royalty issue in 
outlawing the licensing arrangement. It may have done this because the plaintiff did 
have a good basis for its position that it was not involved in mandatory package 
licensing. Among the cases the plaintiff relied on in its brief was International 
Mfg. Co. v. Landon, 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1964). In this 
case the court rejected the misuse defense in a patent infringement suit where 
patentee had offered two patents jointly. The court found that one patent could not 
be used without infringing the other, and held that it was not unlawful to include 
several items in a package if they could reasonably be construed to constitute a single 
distinct package. The Landon court also found that the licensees had refused to take 
the patents seriatum, but had demanded that they be licensed jointly. The defendant 
in Rocform argued that all 189 of its licensees had voluntarily accepted the package, 
and that therefore its licensing practice fell within the rule of Landon and should 
not be regarded as coercive. 
27. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 157-58 (1947). 
28. A licensee might want to take a package because a package makes available a 
number of related patents, and the licensee might not know in advance which of the 
group he will use. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 (1950). 
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considered valid.29 These voluntary licenses have rarely provided for 
any reduction of royalties upon the expiration of some of the patents 
in the package.30 It is submitted that to read Brulotte to overturn 
such voluntary arrangements leads to undesirable results. Instead, 
Brulotte should be interpreted only to prohibit the collection of 
royalties after the last patent has expired; until that patent expires 
traditional package licensing doctrine should remain in effect. 
The cases which had considered the validity of undiminished 
royalty schemes in the package licensing context prior to Rocform 
were inconsistent in result. In 1965, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit concluded in McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Su.rveys, 
Inc.31 that the collection of unreduced royalty payments in a volun-
tary package arrangement was legal. This decision is of particular 
interest because the Tenth Circuit withheld its decision pending 
the Supreme Court's decision in Brulotte and then declared that 
Brulotte did not require it to outlaw the traditional practice of 
collecting undiminished royalties on a package license.32 However, 
even prior to Brulotte some authority did exist which suggested that 
an undiminished royalty scheme was illegal. The Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit had held in American Securit v. Shatterproof 
Glass Corp., a mandatory package licensing case, that it was patent 
misuse for a patentee to collect undiminished royalties for the life 
of a patent package.33 The court apparently confused two separate 
He may also desire a package because package licensing enables him to spread the 
cost of all the patents over the life of the package license. 
29. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
340 U.S. 824 (1950); also by implication, Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 
(1950). 
30. See, e.g., Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1950); 
E. R. Squibb and Sons v. Chemical Foundation, 93 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1937) (upholding a 
practice of collecting royalties until the last patent expires). 
31. 343 F.2d 381, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1965). 
32. 343 F.2d at 409. Subsequently, in McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 
1968 TRADE REG. Ro>. 1[ 72,453 (10th Cir. June 17, 1968), the second McCullough case, 
the Tenth Circuit again considered claims that Well Surveys had misused its patents by 
improperly extending the patent monopoly. The court rejected claims of misuse and 
held that there was an insufficient showing to establish a change in the licensing 
practices approved in the first McCullough case. 
In a third chapter of this litigation, McCullough assisted the defendant infringer 
in the litigation of Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-Log, Inc., 1968 TRADE REG. Ro>. 
'ii 72,482 (10th Cir. June 4, 1968). In this case, the Tenth Circuit held that the fact 
that the plaintiff had an undiminished royalty arrangement for a patent package was 
not indicative of misuse per se. Since the plaintiff patentee presented affidavits of its 
officers to the effect that it was willing to negotiate licenses individually for any of 
the patents in the package, the court held that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment to the defendant infringer, who had relied on Rocform Corp. v. 
Acitelli•Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1967). 
33. 268 F.2d 769, 777 (1959). The court stated: 
Securit's Standard Licensing Agreement which provided that that agreement 
shall continue "in full force and effect to the expiration of the last to expire 
of any" of Securit's patents •.• constitutes a patent misuse for it extends the 
payment of royalties of patents under patents which may expire to the expira-
tion date of that patent most recently granted to Securit. 
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questions: the legality of the royalty scheme and the propriety of 
mandatory package licensing. Under a mandatory package, the 
licensee may well pay royalties on patents that he does not desire; 
here the misuse penalty is appropriate, since the patentee is using 
coercion to exact the payment of royalties for the undesired patents. 
But this is true regardless of the existence of an undiminished 
royalty scheme. The court may not have recognized that by framing 
its holding in terms of the royalty scheme it was casting doubt on the 
legitimacy of the normally accepted method of collecting royalties 
under legitimate voluntary package licenses. 
In Rocform, the Sixth Circuit reached a conclusion similar to 
that of the Securit court; it too found that the collection of un-
diminished royalties after the expiration of the most important patent 
constituted patent misuse. However, the Rocform court did not rely 
on Securit for support. Rather, it disagreed with the McCullough 
court as to the impact of Brulotte and held that undiminished roy-
alty schemes were prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in 
that case. 
V. POST-EXPIRATION ROYALTIES AND THE DOCTRINE OF MISUSE 
It is submitted that the Rocf orm court was incorrect in holding 
that the patentee could not bring an action for infringement because 
he had misused his patent by charging unreduced royalties for a 
voluntary package license. The doctrine of patent misuse is designed 
to advance the constitutional purpose of the patent system-"to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts."34 When a 
patentee uses his patent to subvert this policy, 35 the doctrine of 
misuse provides an infringer of that patent with an equitable de-
fense.36 Most misuse cases, particularly the early ones,37 have involved 
Securit was subsequently cited as controlling in Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. 
Bendix Corp., 218 F. Supp. l (1963). However, the 4th Circuit affirmed the Techno• 
graph case on other grounds, 327 F.2d 497 (1964). 
34. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
35. Misuse was developed in tie-in cases, involving situations in which a patentee 
had conditioned the licensing of a patent upon the licensee's agreement to purchase 
other unpatented items from the patentee. Since unpatented articles are already in 
the public domain, it is argued that such agreements unjustifiably stifle competition 
in those articles and should thus be considered antitrust violations. The Supreme 
Court accepted such reasoning in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) and overruled Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. l (1912), a case 
which had sanctioned such tie-ins. 
36_. An infringement suit is brought in equity, and the misuse doctrine is really a 
manifestation of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. A patentee plaintiff cannot 
obtain relief if he has been abusing the rights obtained under the patent grant, even 
though the defendant infringer may be at fault because the patentee's hands are 
"unclean." An excellent article on the history and application of the misuse doctrine 
is Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 
76 (1962). 
37. E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid Corp. 
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent 
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton 
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patentees who used their patents in violation of the antitrust laws, 
and for this reason antitrust considerations have become enmeshed 
in the misuse doctrine.38 Unfortunately, this mixing of concepts has 
often resulted in findings of misuse based solely on violations of the 
antitrust laws, without consideration of the propriety of the 
patentee's conduct in light of patent policy.39 Thus, it appears that 
either a violation of the antitrust laws or of patent policy, may give 
rise to a finding of patent misuse. Because the defense of misuse 
severely penalizes the patentee,40 it is unfortunate that the courts 
have not weighed the appropriateness of the misuse penalty more 
carefully before applying it to wrongdoing unrelated to patent policy. 
It is submitted that charging unreduced royalties for the use of a 
voluntary package license arrangement does not constitute a viola-
tion of either patent policy or the antitrust laws even if the practice 
does result technically in the payment of post-expiration royalties. 
In fact, such arrangements may advance both patent and antitrust 
policies. The net effect of these agreements is to promote the 
"progress of science and the useful arts" by helping patentees market 
their patents, and at the same time to increase competition by mak-
ing more types of licensing arrangements available to prospective 
licensees. In short, under either a patent or antitrust test of misuse, 
and assuming that Brulotte can be limited to prohibit only the 
collection of royalties after the expiration of the last patent in a 
voluntary package, collecting undiminished royalties as a part of a 
voluntary package licensing arrangement should not be deemed 
patent misuse. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Brulotte should be interpreted to pro-
scribe under the antitrust laws any post-expiration royalties, it is 
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 
302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 
U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 
(1917). 
38. Compare the early Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 
243 U.S. 502 (1917) with the later Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., 320 
U.S. 680 (1944). By the 1940's patent cases were thoroughly imbued with antitrust 
principles. See, e.g., American Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601 
(D. Mass. 1944); Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Urquhart, 69 F. Supp. 555, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1946) 
("[T]he rule against misuse of the patent monopoly is based on the policy of the 
anti-trust laws •••. "). 
39. See Nicoson, supra note 36, at 87. 
40. There are two reasons why a defendant may want to invoke the misuse 
defense. One is that if he proves it, he may have made out an affirmative case for 
treble damages. In addition, the misuse defense gives certain procedural advantages 
to the defendant. See Nicoson, supra note 36, at 90-92. 
Part of the problem is that the courts have entertained misuse defenses in patent 
cases without considering whether "the punishment fits the crime.'' Since the 
defendant infringer who invokes the abuse defense is often himself at fault, many 
commentators have argued that allowing the defense is too harsh a penalty in many 
cases. See, e.g., Hamilton & Tell, What Is a Patent?, Ill LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB, 245 
(1948). 
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interesting to note that in Brulotte the Court did not indicate that 
the facts of the case warranted a finding of misuse. Thus, the Rocf orm 
court's reliance on Brulotte in finding the patentee guilty of misuse 
is at best questionable. In Brulotte, the Court termed the patentee's 
conduct "unlawful per se." While this sounds like an antitrust rule 
and could be said to indicate that the Court might find sufficient 
anticompetitive effect to merit application of the misuse doctrine, 
the opinion may also be read as impliedly rejecting application of 
the harsh misuse doctrine in this context. The Court did not use 
the word "misuse" and did not apply the typical misuse penalty. 
Only those royalties which were to be collected in the post-expiration 
period were adjudged uncollectible; the ordinary misuse penalty 
would presumably have prevented the collection of all royalties for 
the period during which the illegal license was in effect.41 Thus, it 
may be reasonable to imply from Brulotte support for the proposition 
that the policy underlying the patent system provides the conceptual 
basis for the misuse doctrine, and that absent contravention of that 
policy a mere antitrust violation does not automatically constitute 
patent misuse. This interpretation would return the misuse doctrine 
to its proper role by limiting its application to cases where a patentee 
uses his patent in a way which subverts the patent policy. 
In addition, considering the authority upon which Brulotte 
rested, it is even more doubtful that the Court intended the case to 
serve as precedent for a decision that the collection of undiminished 
royalties under a voluntary package license constitutes misuse. It is 
significant that the Court cited a case in which there was but one 
patent, not a package, for the proposition that royalties may not be 
collected after the last patent expires.42 The Court did not rely upon 
Securit,43 a package licensing case which it might have used to sup-
port application of the misuse doctrine. Moreover, the Court distin-
guished and upheld its earlier decision in Automatic Radio Co. v. 
Hazeltine.44 In that case the patentee had offered over five hundred 
patents in a package, and although some of the patents had expired 
the Court did not strike down the undiminished royalty arrange-
ment. In proscribing the unreduced royalty provision in Brulotte, 
the Court held that Brulotte differed from Hazeltine because in the 
former the last patent had expired, whereas all the patents in 
Hazeltine had not expired.45 Thus, it is submitted that the Sixth 
Circuit was incorrect in relying on Brulotte when it proscribed the 
41. For example, if a licensee wants patents A and B, and the patentee refuses to 
license these patents unless the licensee also accepts C, there is a coercive patent 
misuse. The patentee loses not only the right to collect royalties for patent C, but the 
right to collect all royalties for patents A and B as well. 
42. Ar-tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 497 (1962). 
43. 268 F.2d 769 (1959). See note 33 supra and accompanying text. 
44. 339 U.S. 829 (1950). 
45. 379 U.S. at 33. It is clear that the Hazeltine court implicitly sanctioned a 
licensing practice which the Securit Court would find objectionable. The former 
decision, that of the Supreme Court, would seem entitled to greater weight. See 
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collection of undiminished royalties under a voluntary package 
licensing arrangement in Rocf orm. 
However, even assuming that the Rocf orm court was correct in 
holding that as a general proposition a patentee can be found guilty 
of misuse if he charges unreduced royalties for a package license, still 
it is arguable that at least on the £acts of Rocform the defendant 
should not have been able to take advantage of the defense. Misuse 
should be available, if at all, only when the defendant infringer can 
show that the patentee has refused a reasonable request for some 
other legitimate licensing provision.46 Indeed, in Well Surveys, Inc. 
v. Perfo-Log, Inc.,47 an infringement action by a patentee against an 
infringer who asserted misuse as a defense, the Tenth Circuit distin-
guished Rocform on its £acts and held that the presence of an un-
diminished royalty scheme did not constitute misuse per se.48 In 
holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
to the defendant infringer (who relied on Rocform), the court em-
phasized the fact that the patentee had presented evidence that any 
of the patents in the licensed package was available individually to 
any prospective licensee.49 In Rocform the court allowed a non-
licensee infringer to invoke the misuse defense without any showing 
that the patentee would have been unwilling to use another licensing 
arrangement.150 Thus, the infringer avoided paying damages not 
because the patentee was forcing unreduced royalties upon his 
licensees, but simply because the patentee was receiving such royal-
ties from them under a voluntary package licensee. This result is 
unnecessarily harsh on the patentee and could be avoided under a 
request and refusal test. By limiting the misuse defense to cases 
where a defendant can demonstrate that the unreduced arrangement 
was forced upon licensees, such a test would restrict application of 
the misuse doctrine to cases in which there is at least an argument 
that the patentee has violated basic patent policy by forcing licensees 
to pay post-expiration royalties. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF RocFORM 
If it becomes settled that charging unreduced royalties under 
voluntary package licenses amounts to misuse, package licensing as 
it has heretofore been practiced will no longer be feasible. The 
parties to a license will not be able simply to settle upon a general 
McCarthy, A Patent Licensing Policy for Minimizing Antitrust and Misuse Risks, 46 
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 547 (1964). 
46. McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 
379 U.S. 826 (1965). 
47. 1968 TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 72,482 (10th Cir. June 4, 1968). 
48. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. 
49. 1968 TRADE REG. REP. 1f 72,482, at 85,573. 
50. The court stated that "[s]uch a demand for an unpackaged license is not, how-
ever, held essential to a defense of misuse when the patent-holder seeks equitable 
relief from infringement while still pursuing the illegal practice." 367 F.2d at 680. 
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price for a patent package and will instead have to negotiate a virtual 
per-patent charge. As noted earlier, this will require higher early 
payments and will probably eliminate some potential licensees from 
the market.51 And, assuming that licensees can be found, Rocform 
adds other uncertainties. Heretofore, the courts could uphold vol-
untary package licenses without further questions, but now the 
courts apparently must ferret out the "most important" patent in a 
package and ascertain whether the rates were properly reduced when 
that patent expired. Rocform provides no guidelines for identifying 
the "most important" patent, or for determining the proper reduc-
tion of the royalties. Moreover, it fails to state how a court should 
react if it finds that there is, in fact, no "most important" patent. 
Finally, Rocform implies that a process package will still be valid,li2 
but again it fails to define standards to distinguish such a package 
from a patent package. Thus, by basing its conclusion that the 
royalty provisions in the Rocform license were unlawful on Brulotte 
rather than on the possible ground that the license was coercive,53 
the Rocform court raised a number of problems which it apparently 
did not appreciate, and which will give other courts considerable 
difficulty. 
There are arrangements by which patentees could meet the 
mandate of Roe/ orm. As has previously been suggested, licensing 
agreements could provide for a per-patent reduction of royalties. 
Patentees operating under this system would anticipate that some re-
duction may be required upon the expiration of any patent, and they 
would thereby eliminate the problem of guessing which patent a court 
might find to be the "most important." If this is the way patentees 
choose to meet the requirements of Rocform, voluntary package 
licensing will cease to exist, since patents in effect will be marketed 
singly. Although this scheme would conform to Rocform, several 
troublesome problems would remain. First, a patentee and licensee 
would somehow have to negotiate a suitable reduction upon the 
expiration of each patent.54 Second, under this plan the licensee 
would be unable to defer the payment of the royalties and might 
experience financial difficulties.55 Finally, this scheme imposes a 
rather substantial administrative burden on the patentee. 56 In a case 
51. See note 19 supra and text accompanying notes 18 &:: 19. 
52. 367 F.2d at 679, 680. The court found that the payments were too great for 
defendant to claim that they were for services and know-how. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the payments were for the patents and not the process. This leaves open 
the possibility that deferred payments may be legal as a "process" if they are pro• 
portionate to the services and know-how supplied by the patentee after the expiration 
of the patent. 
53. See note 26 supra. 
54. Cf. Hamilton&:: Tell, supra note 40 at 257. 
55. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
56. Cf. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: .A.n 
April 1968) Comments 1263 
like Hazeltine, for example, keeping track of the expiration dates 
of over 500 patents and altering royalty charges accordingly would 
presumably involve considerable expense. The patentee would un-
doubtedly try to pass this expense on to the licensee, and the 
licensee, in turn, could be expected to account for his higher costs 
by charging the public more for the patented item. 
Another possible way for a patentee to conform to the Rocform 
ruling is to give the licensee an option to cancel the license at the 
expiration of each patent. Such a provision would certainly eliminate 
any question as to whether the licensee was coerced into accepting 
the package. In addition, since the licensee would be free to terminate 
if he concluded that the remaining patents were less valuable than 
the undiminished royalties he would have to continue to pay, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the licensee would not be paying royal-
ties for expired patents. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that patentees, licensees, and courts will face a number 
of practical difficulties if they attempt to meet the demands of 
Rocform. For this reason the best solution to the post-expiration 
royalty problem posed by package licensing arrangements would be 
to limit Brulotte to a strict last patent test and not to interpret it as 
general authority for the proposition that the collection ofroyalties on 
expired patents constitutes patent misuse. While this will not change 
the fact that Brulotte is economically unsound, it will at least not 
extend the infirmities of that decision into the package licensing 
context, and it will allow the settled body of package licensing law 
to stand. 
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966), where the author argues that the patent 
grant should be expanded to accommodate administrative needs of the patentee: 
A patentee is entitled to extract monopoly income by restricting utilization 
of his inventions notwithstanding that utilization of other goods and services 
are consequently restricted provided that in each case he confines the restric-
tions to his inventions as narrowly and specifically as the technology of the situa-
tion and the practicalities of administration permit. 
